【題  目】The Macroeconomic Consequences of Competition for College Admissions

【時(shí)  間】2025年12月24日（星期三），14:00-15:30

【地  點(diǎn)】后主樓1722會(huì)議室

【主講人】顧詩駿 講師（中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院）

【主持人】王  言 講師（北京師范大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理學(xué)院）

摘要：To study how competition in college admissions drives parental investment and informs child development policies, we develop a heterogeneous-agent life-cycle model in which parents invest in their children’s human capital not only to increase future labor productivity but also to compete for limited college seats. Inefficiency arises because each family takes the admissions threshold as given and thus does not internalize how its own investment raises the admissions bar for others. Estimating our model with Chinese data, we find that a significant portion of parental monetary investment is driven by this competition-induced externality. Policies that reduce competition can deliver sizable welfare gains by correcting the externality, but their long-run effects are also shaped by intergenerational dynamics: lower investment today can worsen the human capital distribution of future generations. We show that a policy mix—taxing private education spending while subsidizing public investment—optimally balances the efficiency gains from externality correction against the need to sustain long-run human capital accumulation, thereby improving overall welfare.  

報(bào)告人簡介：顧詩駿，中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院講師、碩士生導(dǎo)師、明尼蘇達(dá)大學(xué)獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士。研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)楹暧^經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、勞動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。研究課題涉及教育投資與人力資本發(fā)展，財(cái)富分布與家庭消費(fèi)、中國經(jīng)濟(jì)改革與轉(zhuǎn)軌。學(xué)術(shù)研究發(fā)表在Journal of Monetary Economics,、Journal of International Money and Finance等國際學(xué)術(shù)期刊，主持國家自然科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目。